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Changing the International Law
of Sovereign Inununity Through
National Decisions
Lori Fisler Damrosch*
ABSTRACT

The internationallaw of sovereign immunity derives from
state practice embodied in national judicial decisions and
legislation. Although some U.S. Supreme Court decisions refer
to this body of law using terms like "grace and comity," the
customary international law of sovereign immunity is law,
which national courts should consider when arriving at
immunity decisions. While it would be possible for a widely
followed international treaty to work changes in customary
international law, the UN Convention on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property has not done so yet.
National legislation such as the U.S. Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act can precipitatechanges in the internationallaw
of sovereign immunity, as can innovative lawsuits prompting
national courts to reexamine theories of immunity. The
International Court of Justice should refrain from interfering
with the ability of national institutions to provide remedies for
wrongful conduct of the type involved in Germany's suit against
Italy.
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This essay takes up several aspects of the complementary roles
of national and international courts, as well as national legislatures
(in the absence of an international legislature as such), with respect
to the progressive development of the customary international law of
sovereign immunity. The following questions are addressed:
Is there an international law of sovereign immunity?
(1)
Assuming an affirmative answer, what gives it its quality as law,
rather than mere grace, comity, or usage? What are the sources of
that body of international law as law?
What is the relevance of the United Nations Convention
(2)
on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property for today's
international law of sovereign immunity?' To date, the UN
Convention has attracted little support as an international treaty,
and thus one must ask whether it has any significance as evidence of
an evolving customary international law of sovereign immunity.
Has national legislation, such as the U.S. Foreign
(3)
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 2 made a useful contribution in
staking out claims in contested domains, such as the expropriation
exception or the terrorist state exception to immunity?
How do we assess innovative approaches by litigants who
(4)
bring suits against foreign states in national courts on novel theories?
How do we assess the rulings of national courts, such as those in
Italy, that have taken the first steps to decide unprecedented
questions? Are these litigation strategies and judicial decisions at the
national level beginning to produce a change in the existing
landscape of customary international law? If the law is indeed
changing, are the trajectories of change taking the law in salutary
directions?
Now that Germany has asked the International Court of
(5)
Justice (ICJ) to put a stop to Italy's innovations,3 is an ICJ ruling on
the matter likely to curb such developments in customary
international law, allow them to continue, or potentially even

United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
1.
Their Property, G.A. Res. 59/38, U.N. Doc. AIRES/59/38 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter UN
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities] (convention not yet in force).
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611
2.
(2006).
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Application Instituting
3.
Proceedings, at 4 (Dec. 23, 2008), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docketfiles/143/
14923.pdf; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Order (July 4, 2011), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16556.pdf.
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encourage them? How might such a ruling be received within the
Italian legal system?

I. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS LAW
Is there an international law of sovereign immunity? If so, where
it
did originate? How can we identify it today? How might it change?
A bit of confusion about the "law" in sovereign immunity law
comes from language used by the U.S. Supreme Court in many of its
sovereign immunity cases: that the decision of one state to grant
immunity to another is a matter of "grace and comity," from which
one might infer, incorrectly in my view, that international law is not
necessarily relevant to the matter. This notion originated with
language in the Supreme Court's first, much-quoted sovereign
immunity decision, The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.4 Written by
Chief Justice John Marshall, this opinion emphasized that the
absolute territorial sovereignty of each state "is susceptible of no
limitation not imposed by itself' and treated comity as the basis for
finding an implied waiver of jurisdiction when a foreign prince or
public armed ship enters the territory with the consent of the
territorial sovereign. 5 In the FSIA era, the Court's sovereign
immunity cases cite The Schooner Exchange without elaboration, for
the proposition that immunity "is a matter of grace and comity rather
than a constitutional requirement," and international law is not even
mentioned as a potentially relevant source of law.6 Soon after the
Court's Austria v. Altmann decision reiterated this approach, Gerald
Neuman wrote an insightful article aptly titled "The Abiding
Significance of Law in Foreign Relations," in which he observed that
the Court in Altmann focused so strongly on the FSIA "that it
7
appeared to have lost sight of the international law lying behind it."
Justice Stevens's majority opinion quotes from the FSIA but omits its
reference to international law, "and one could read the entire opinion
without intuiting that the immunity of foreign states was a subject
addressed by international law."8 Most recently, in Samantar v.

The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
4.
Id. at 136, 145-46.
5.
See, e.g., Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 688-91 (2004)
6.
(citing The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116; Verlinden B.V v. Cent. Bank of
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983); and other cases in which immunity was granted or denied
in accordance with the preferences of the political branches).
Gerald L. Neuman, The Abiding Significance of Law in Foreign Relations,
7.
2004 SUP. CT. REV. 111, 138-39 (emphasis added).
Id.
8.
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Yousuf, the Court recapitulated the "grace and comity" point with
reference to these cases.9 After holding (correctly in my view) that the
FSIA does not apply to individuals, the Court essentially ignored
international law in concluding that federal courts are to decide such
cases on the basis of federal common law. 10
To conclude on the contrast between "grace and comity" on the
one hand and international law on the other, I believe that the Court
would have been on firmer ground if its Altmann and Samantar
decisions had acknowledged that international law-customary
international law-is part of the relevant matrix of law that federal
courts should consider, either in construing a statute enacted against
the background of international law (as was the case with the FSIA)11
or in addressing the nature of the sources that federal courts should
consult when ruling on claims of immunity outside of the four corners
of the statute.1 2 To ignore the international law of immunity in
national judicial decisions on immunity is to deprive those decisions
of their secure foundations in law, and also undercuts the authority of
the domestic court in contributing to the development of the body of
custom that constitutes international law.13

9.
Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S.Ct. 2278, 2280-85 (2010).
10.
As the discussion earlier in the symposium has brought out, the U.S.
government's position in Samantar is that the legal basis for determining immunity of
individuals affiliated with foreign states should be "common law principles articulated
by the Executive Branch and informed by customary international law." Sarah H.
Cleveland, Louis Henkin Professor in Human and Constitutional Rights, Columbia
Law Sch., Remarks at the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law Symposium:
Foreign State Immunity at Home and Abroad (Feb. 4, 2011). Our foreign colleagues
could well wonder why the Supreme Court failed to analyze the customary
international law principles relevant to individual immunities. See Christian
Tomuschat, The InternationalLaw of State Immunity and Its Development by National
Institutions, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1105 (2011) (noting that U.S. courts do not
recognize customary international law as "truly binding"). Courts elsewhere have
properly treated state immunity as a matter not of discretion but of international law.
See, e.g., Jones v. Ministry of Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL
26, [2007] 1 A.C. 270, [36]-[49] (Lord Hoffman) (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)) (U.K.)
("It is necessary carefully to examine the sources of international law concerning the
particular immunity claimed."); Lorna McGregor, Dir. LLM Int'l Human Rights Law,
Univ. of Essex, Remarks at the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law Symposium:
Foreign State Immunity at Home and Abroad (Feb. 4, 2011) (discussing Jones, [2006]
UKHL 26 and Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 101).
11.
Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006) ("Under international law, states are not
immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities
are concerned ....
); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 8 (1976) ("Sovereign immunity is a
doctrine of international law under which domestic courts, in appropriate cases,
relinquish jurisdiction over a foreign state.").
On the potential relevance of international law as part of a federal common
12.
law inquiry, see Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S.
Courts: The Case Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 915, 960-61, 971-75
(2011).
13.
By contrast, in the national judicial decisions that Germany is now
challenging at the ICJ, Italian courts appear to have grounded their reasoning in the
customary international law of sovereign immunity, which may give those decisions
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On the assumption that the present audience does not need
further persuasion that our subject is indeed one about which
international law does have something to say,14 I turn now to the UN
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States (the Convention)
as potentially relevant evidence of the customary international law of
state immunity.

II. THE UN CONVENTION ON JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES
The Convention, a relatively new instrument finalized in 2004, is
the culmination of decades of on-again, off-again efforts by the United
Nations International Law Commission (ILC) to bridge formidable
cleavages during a period of rapid changes in state practice
concerning sovereign immunity.' 5 As its main features have been
covered elsewhere in this symposium, 16 I will confine myself here to
aspects bearing on its usefulness as evidence of international custom.
Writing about the Convention soon after it was opened for
signature, David Stewart predicted "rapid adoption by a considerable
number of states currently lacking domestic statutes on sovereign
immunity."' 7 In the ensuing six years, that prediction has not yet
come true. Not only is the Convention not yet in force, but it has had
relatively few adoptions to date: only twenty-eight states have signed
and only eleven have ratified or acceded as of the symposium's date.18

more authority at the ICJ and in other arenas outside Italy. On this point, see
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Application Instituting Proceedings,
supra note 3.
14.
Compare the remarks of Russia's culture minister, Aleksandr Avdeyev, in
relation to a lawsuit brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
over archival documents held in Russia: '[T]he issue, my friends, is international law,
rather than domestic American law,' Mr. Avdeyev said. 'Under international law there
is state jurisdiction, and if you want to sue, fine, sue us on Russian territory."' Carol
Vogel & Clifford J. Levy, Dispute DerailsArt Loans From Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
2011, at C1.
15.
For an overview, see David P. Stewart, The UN Convention on
JurisdictionalImmunities of States and Their Property, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 194 (2005).
David P. Stewart, The Immunity of State Officials Under the UN
16.
Convention on JurisdictionalImmunities of States and Their Property, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1047 (2011) (discussing, in detail, the history of the Convention and its
implications for foreign sovereign immunity in the United States).
Stewart, supra note 15, at 211.
17.
18.
UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 1. The eclectic
list of ratifying states consists of Austria, Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Norway,
Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, and Switzerland. Since neither Germany
nor Italy is a party, it will not govern their dispute at the ICJ, discussed infra text
accompanying notes 60-63, except to the extent that the ICJ considers it relevant
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These numbers fall far short of what is typically considered reliable
evidence that a treaty reflects customary international law binding
on nonparties to the treaty.1 9
In some respects, to be sure, the fact that the ILC was able to
reach agreement on certain formulations of rules of foreign state
immunity could provide modest support for the proposition that
states believe that the rules so formulated correspond to the
requirements of customary international law (the opinio juris
component in classic theories of international law).20 However, in
order to satisfy the expectations of a serious inquiry into the status of
a putative rule of customary international law, one would also need to
show that states follow the same rules in their patterns of practice.
This may be true for some of the provisions of the Convention, but
probably only for those that represented the lowest common
denominator of state practice at the time the Convention was
negotiated, such as acceptance that a state is not entitled to
immunity for commercial transactions as regards disputes falling
within the forum's jurisdiction under applicable rules of private
international law. 21 It is doubtful that the same could be said of all
the Convention's provisions, many of which appear to represent
negotiated compromises among divergent trends in state practice in
the years leading up to the final agreement. 22
Most significantly, it is implausible that a treaty negotiated in
full awareness that it was not congruent with existing immunity law
and practice of leading states could be understood as establishing new
rules of customary international law at odds with the FSIA and
judicial decisions in the United States and other countries. Unless
and until such states adopt the Convention's provisions as treaty
obligations or take action within their own legal systems to embrace
the new rules, they would be free not only to continue their
preexisting practices but also to develop new customary international
law through changing practice.
The absence of provisions in the Convention specifying
exceptions to immunity that correspond to exceptions available in
certain domestic legislation does not necessarily give rise to an
inference that the default rule in customary international law

evidence of customary international law, which is doubtful for the reasons discussed
herein.
19.
On the relationship of custom and treaties, see generally INTERNATIONAL
LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 118-21 (Lori F. Damrosch et al. eds., 5th ed. 2009).
20.
Id. at 90-112.
21.
UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 1, arts. 2(1)(c),
2(2), 10(1).
22.
For example, the tort exception as formulated in Article 12 accepts that
states cannot invoke immunity for certain types of acts or omissions occurring in the
forum, but it appears to take a narrower approach to tort liability than that applied in
the FSIA. See Stewart, supra note 15, at 201-03.
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requires that immunity be granted. In contrast to the FSIA, which
the Supreme Court has interpreted as establishing the "sole" basis for
deciding claims of immunity in U.S. courts, 23 the UN Convention
cannot preclude the existence and progressive development of a
parallel body of customary international law on immunity, which
need not be the same as the Convention's rules. Only between treaty
partners, and only to the extent that the Convention's provisions
reflect an intent to specify an exclusive list of exceptions to immunity,
would it be reasonable to conclude that immunity must be allowed if
an express exception has not been made.
Because of significant discrepancies between the Convention and
the FSIA, which are surveyed elsewhere, 24 there is not likely to be
much interest in the United States in displacing the U.S. statute and
the growing corpus of judicial decisions under it with the different
formulations found in the Convention. The case would have to be
made that the United States stands to benefit by adjusting its own
approach in the direction of compromises hammered out in a
multilateral arena. In the absence of a groundswell of support for the
Convention's rules among other developed states, U.S. policymakers
are not likely to see any advantages to changing the current U.S.
rules.
The meager number of ratifications to date, and particularly the
lack of interest from states with well-established rule-of-law
traditions, leaves the usefulness of the Convention very much open to
doubt. It would be interesting to learn from European colleagues at
this symposium whether there is serious discussion in their countries
about becoming party to the Convention, and if so, for what reason.
European scholars are beginning to write about the Convention with
attention to its compatibility with existing bodies of law and potential
interactions between the Convention and decisions about state
immunity in national and international tribunals. 25

23.
See, e.g., Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 699 (2004);
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989) (finding
that the FSIA provides the "sole basis" for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in
U.S. courts).
24.
See Stewart, supra note 15, at 199 n.31 (divergence between approaches to
commercial activity under the Convention and the FSIA); id. at 201-03 (differences
concerning tortious conduct); id. at 205-06 (absence from Convention of provisions
corresponding to FSIA exceptions for expropriation and terrorism); id. at 207 n.74
("inexact parallels" as regards certain measures of constraint); id. at 211 n.93
(predicting difficulty in ratifying the Convention in countries with already developed
statutory frameworks for sovereign immunity).
25.
See e.g., Andrea Atteritano, Immunity of States and Their Organs: The
Contributionof Italian Jurisprudenceover the Past Ten Years, 19 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L.
33, 36-38 (2009) (discussing the UN Convention and a possible jus cogens exception to
immunity); Riccardo Pavoni, A Decade of Italian Case Law on the Immunity of Foreign
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III. THE FSIA AND OTHER NATIONAL LAWS: CATALYSTS FOR
CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The enactment of the FSIA in 1976 was one among several
developments in national legislation to produce significant changes in
the landscape of state practice concerning immunity in the 1970s and
the ensuing time period. 26 The FSIA was subsequently amended
several times, notably to add a "terrorist state" exception in 1996,
which was maintained and recodified in the 2008 amendments. 27
A driving motivation for the U.S. Congress's action to create an
exception to immunity for state sponsors of terrorism was the fact
that the relatives of victims in the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103
over Lockerbie, Scotland were lobbying intensively for such a change,
in connection with lawsuits brought against Libya in U.S. courts to
obtain redress for the attack.2 8 Those lawsuits advanced creative
theories for interpreting the FSIA in the absence of a clearly
applicable exception to immunity, 29 such as an implied waiver of
immunity on a jus cogens theory.30 Prior to the enactment of the
terrorist state exception, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second

States: Lights and Shadows, 19 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 73, 78-79 (2009); see also
Annalisa Ciampi, The Italian Court of Cassation Asserts Civil Jurisdiction over
Germany in a Criminal Case Relating to the Second World War: The Civitella Case, 7 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 597, 607-08 (2009) (discussing implications arising out of Italy's lack
of treaty obligations or national legislation on foreign sovereign immunity).
26.
One recent catalogue of immunity statutes identifies the United States,
United Kingdom, Pakistan, South Africa, and Canada as having legislation on the
subject. See Atteritano, supra note 25, at 34 n.1. Interestingly, these countries are all
common law systems; codification of immunity law has apparently not been thought
necessary in civil-law countries, though statutes regulating particular aspects of
immunity practice have occasionally been adopted in such countries. A recent example
is the enactment in Italy of a law specifically suspending enforcement proceedings
against a foreign state during the pendency of an ICJ case challenging such measures
of execution. See id. at 46-47 (discussing Decree-Law No. 63, Decreto Legge 28 aprile
2010, n. 63 (It.) (codified into law by Legge 23 giugno 2010, n. 98)).
27.
The 1996 amendment (part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241 (1996)) added a new exception for state
sponsors of terrorism in what was then § 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)
(1996), repealed by Pub. L. No 110-181, § 1803(b), 122 Stat. 341 (Jan. 29, 2008). With
the 2008 amendments, the recodification of the terrorist state exception is now found at
§ 1605A. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2008).
28.
See Jonathan B. Schwartz, Dealing with a "Rogue State": The Libya
Precedent, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 553, 563 (2007) (discussing the role of victims' relatives
in motivating the abrogation of sovereign immunities for countries designated as state
sponsors of terrorism).
29.
The tort exception of § 1605(a)(5) was limited to conduct occurring in the
United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2006) (current version at § 1605A).
30.
Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 242,
245-46 (2d Cir. 1996) (dismissing the suit and rejecting the argument that a state
impliedly waives sovereign immunity whenever it violates fundamental jus cogens
norms).
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Circuit was not persuaded by any of these innovative approaches. 31
Congress, however, was convinced that justice would be better served
by opening the U.S. forum to this category of suits-which involved
personal injury or death from acts committed by terrorist states-on
several conditions, including:
(1) the acts on which suit could be brought would be limited to
torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the
provision of material support for such an act;
(2) the act must be committed by an agent of a foreign state
acting within the scope of employment;
(3) the defendant state must be designated by the Department
of State as a state sponsor of terrorism;
(4) the claimant or victim must be a U.S. national; and
(5) the claimant must have offered the foreign state an
opportunity to arbitrate the claim.32
The terrorist state exception has given rise to quite interesting
litigation, as well as several efforts to enforce judgments against
states subject to the exception, mostly in cases where the foreign
state defaulted in the U.S. proceeding.3 3 Congress has lent some
support to those efforts through several amendments, culminating in
the 2008 recodification of the terrorist state exception.3 4
I will comment only on one aspect of this intriguing series of
cases, in relation to the pending litigation at the ICJ involving claims
of immunity (litigation that was the focus of other presentations on
this symposium panel).3 5 At the time of enactment of the terrorist
state exception to the FSIA, which Congress clearly intended to apply
to Libya,36 Libya was already suing the United States and the United

31.
Id. at 242-45 (concluding that Congress did not intend to include an
implied waiver when drafting 1996 amendment to FSIA).
28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1605A (2006). For discussion and critique, see Lori
32.
Fisler Damrosch, Enforcing International Law Through Non-Forcible Measures, 269
RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 172-76 (1997) (criticizing the requirement of U.S. citizenship
and raising questions about making availability of judicial remedy turn on political
determination of state sponsorship of terrorism, but noting that "[o]n
balance .. . Congress made a reasonable choice not to open up every State in the world
to these kinds of suits").
33.
See, e.g., Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F. Supp. 2d 53, 54 (D.D.C.
2008) (applying the terrorist state exception in suit against Syrian government for
material support of Al-Qaeda in Iraq).
34.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110181, 122 Stat. 3, 1083 (2008).
35.
See Elena Sciso, Italian Judges'Pointof View on Foreign States' Immunity,
44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1201 (2011); Tomuschat, supra note 10.
36.
See Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748 (2d
Cir. 1998) (applying amendment in face of Libyan argument that it retroactively
expanded Libya's liability to suit in the United States).
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Kingdom at the ICJ in an effort to forestall or deflect the application
of UN Security Council sanctions to Libya.37 Libya was unsuccessful
in its request for provisional measures to restrain the two permanent
members of the Security Council from proceeding with their efforts to
mobilize compulsory measures of coercion against it,3 8 but it did
continue to litigate the matter for several more years. Ultimately,
Libya reached agreements with the United States and the United
Kingdom to settle some of their demands, and eventually settled all
matters then in dispute.3 9
It would require only a small variation from the real-world facts
of Libya's ICJ case to suppose that Libya could have framed its claims
at the ICJ in such a manner as to call into question the exercise by
U.S. courts of jurisdiction over Libya under the terrorist state
exception. 40 Focusing just on the merits of the issues that might have
been raised in such a claim, we can see that the structure of the
argument would bear some similarity to the theories that Germany is
urging to the ICJ in its application against Italy in its presently
pending case. 41 The applicant state would contend that the
respondent state subjected the applicant to the jurisdiction of
respondent's courts under circumstances that are essentially
unprecedented. Therefore, the argument would continue, jurisdiction
cannot be grounded in preexisting customary practice, and
accordingly jurisdiction is contrary to a baseline understanding of
sovereign immunity as the default rule, from which the only
exceptions have to be justified in terms of custom.
One can speculate that the ICJ would not have looked favorably
on Libya's claim to be immune from the exercise of national civil
jurisdiction by states whose nationals died in a terrorist attack
(assuming that the U.S.-UK position attributing the attack to the
Libyan state-which Libya disputed-could have been established on
facts proved in the litigation). Undoubtedly, part of the legally
relevant context would have been the Security Council resolutions
demanding that Libya be held accountable for the destruction of Pan

37.
Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), Order, 1992 I.C.J. 3, 114
(Apr. 14) (request for the indication of provisional measures).
38.
Id.
For a complete account of the settlement, see Schwartz, supra note 28, at
39.
567-73.
40.
For purposes of argument, we would need to assume that Libya could have
maintained such a claim in the jurisdictional context of its suit against the United
States under the jurisdictional clause of the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, opened for signatureSept. 23, 1971,
24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1973) [hereinafter
Montreal Convention], and that Libya could have amended its ICJ application after the
enactment of the 1996 terrorist state exception to the FSIA.
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Application Instituting
41.
Proceedings, supra note 3, at 4.
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Am Flight 103.42 But those resolutions did not create the obligation,
nor would they have been the source of the best legal reasons for
rejecting a Libyan argument of entitlement to sovereign immunity on
claims against it for having perpetrated a terrorist act.
Of course, we do not have any adjudication by the ICJ on the
hypothetical legal challenge by Libya to the terrorist state exception.
But we do know that at the end of the day, incentivized in no small
measure by the fact that Congress created this exception to immunity
for the benefit of the Lockerbie plaintiffs, Libya did in fact pay $2.7
billion into an escrow account, which was to be paid out as
reparations to the victims' families. 4 3 In the end, the removal of
immunity pursuant to the FSIA amendment was one of the most
formidable elements of leverage against a wrongdoer state to induce
it to reach a just settlement.
A similar lesson can be drawn from the Altmann case, which
involved the application of the FSIA's expropriation exception. In
Altmann, the plaintiff alleged that during or after World War II,
Austria wrongfully took several paintings by Gustav Klimt belonging
to an Austrian Jewish family.44 Congress, in enacting the
expropriation exception in 1976, did not follow any preexisting
practice of disallowing immunity in such circumstances. Austria
argued that immunity should be ascertained under the law applicable
at the time of the alleged taking, when foreign states would have
been considered absolutely immune under then-prevailing views of
immunity in U.S. and international law. 4 5 The U.S. Supreme Court
found the 1976 FSIA to be the sole and exclusive source of law, even
as to claims arising decades before its enactment. 46 That view of the
statute, which was correct as a matter of interpretation of the text
and congressional intent, did not violate international law, even in
the absence of a prior international practice of treating expropriation
as coming under an exception to immunity from national judicial
jurisdiction.
After the Court's ruling in Altmann, which held only that the
FSIA provided the relevant rules of law and not how the law should
be applied on the facts of the particular case, the parties decided to

42.
S.C. Res. 883, U.N. Doc. S/RES/883 (Nov. 11, 1993) (imposing further
sanctions to enforce Resolution 748); S.C. Res. 748, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31,
1992) (making Resolution 731's request binding pursuant to Councils' compulsory
powers under Chapter VII of UN Charter); S.C. Res. 731, 1 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/731
(Jan. 21, 1992) (urging Libya to provide a "full and effective response").
43.
Schwartz, supra note 28, at 571 n.105.
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 680-81 (2004).
44.
45.
Id. at 686.
46.
Id. at 698.
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arbitrate their dispute.47 Maria Altmann's claim against the Republic
of Austria for ownership of the paintings was ultimately vindicated in
arbitration. 48 She subsequently sold Klimt's portrait of her aunt,
Adele Bloch-Bauer, to Ronald S. Lauder for $135 million, and it now
hangs in the Neue Galerie in New York City. 49
As with the Libyan hypothetical, one could readily imagine a
scenario under which an arbitral tribunal, or conceivably the ICJ,
would be asked to determine whether Austria enjoyed immunity
under customary international law from a claim of expropriation of
property confiscated from victims of racial or religious persecution.
Leaving aside other issues of factual and legal dispute (such as
whether Adele Bloch-Bauer's will required or merely requested that
the portrait be donated to the Austrian state museum after her
husband's death) and focusing just on whether customary
international law requires a default rule of immunity and prohibits
an exception to rectify such a profound injustice, the answer must be
that customary international law does not freeze the law as it might
have existed during World War II to prevent national courts from
affording a remedy for wrongful expropriation.
IV. INNOVATIVE SUITS IN NATIONAL COURTS

U.S. courts in the FSIA era were not the first national courts to
forge new approaches to holding. foreign states accountable for
wrongful acts, nor are they the only ones to have extended the
available exceptions to immunity to reach Holocaust-related injuries.
Already in the early years of the twentieth century, Italian and
Belgian courts were taking the first steps to apply a then-new
restrictive theory of state immunity to allow foreign states to be sued
on their commercial or other private acts.5 0 As Italian scholars point
out, the fact that Italian courts were among the first to allow lawsuits
to proceed against foreign states under the restrictive theory does not
mean that those first judgments violated international law.5 1 The
Italian courts may have correctly applied a hitherto-unacknowledged
exception implicit in existing customary international law, or they
may have effectively transformed the law by articulating a rule that
other states in due course embraced. 52 More recently, Italian courts

47.
See William Grimes, Maria V. Altmann, Pursuer of Family Klimts, Dies at
94, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 9, 2011, at B19.
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
Atteritano, supra note 25, at 37.
50.
Id.
51.
For thoughtful exposition of this distinction, see id. at 34-39.
52.
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have allowed suits against foreign states on Holocaust claims in the
series of cases that Germany is now contesting at the ICJ.5 3
The impact of such national judicial decisions on the customary
international law of sovereign immunity can only be discerned with
attention to the persuasiveness of the judicial reasoning advanced in
the cases themselves, which may or may not incline decision makers
in other countries to follow the same path. 54 It appears that the
rulings of the Italian courts have elicited spirited reactions from
judges confronting comparable claims in other contexts. 55 On the
international level, Greece recently applied to the ICJ for permission
to intervene in Germany's case against Italy, in order to protect and
preserve Greece's position regarding attempts to enforce the
judgments of Italian courts against German assets in Greece.56
In order for the customary international law of sovereign
immunity to continue to evolve in response to actions and reactions of
diverse decision makers in a variety of countries (judicial, legislative,
and executive), an active dialogue among institutions should be
encouraged. Inter-judicial dialogue-the process by which courts take
note of previous rulings elsewhere and determine whether or not to
follow them---can illuminate the issues and articulate reasons either
for maintaining traditional conceptions of state immunity or for
adjusting preconceptions in light of evolving views on the optimal role
for national courts in providing remedies for wrongs committed by
foreign states.

V. THE ICJ CASE AND ITS POTENTIAL RECEPTION IN ITALY
In advance of the closing of the pleadings in Germany's suit
against Italy at the ICJ and the holding of oral hearings which will
give a transparent exposition of both sides' legal arguments, it is
imprudent to venture speculation as to how the ICJ might rule. In my
view, the ICJ should refrain from a ruling that would interfere with

53.
See, e.g., Cass., sez. un., 11 marzo 2004, n. 5044 (It.), summarized in
Andrea Bianchi, Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany. Italian Court of Cassation,
March 11, 2004, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 242 (2005); see also Cass., sez. un., 29 maggio 2008,
n. 14199 (It.), summarized in Carlo Focarelli, Federal Republic of Germany v. Giovanni
Mantelli and Others. Order No. 14201, 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 122, 126 (2009) (discussing
several other cases allowing such suits against foreign states).
54.
Cf. Focarelli, supra note 53, at 130 (discussing the need for courts to justify
their "deviating" rulings with reasons that could form the basis for a generalizable rule
of reciprocal and universal application).
55.
For a discussion of the assessments by the UK Law Lords of the Italian
ruling in Ferrini,see id. at 126 n.17, 130 n.31.
56.
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Order, supra note 3.

1198

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL, 44:1185

the ability of national institutions-judicial or otherwise-to provide
remedies for the kinds of wrongful conduct at stake in the Italian
cases. Germany's ICJ application makes reference to a series of
Italian lawsuits exemplified by the Ferrini case, involving German
conduct during World War II, from which Germany claims to be
shielded by immunity on the theory that the acts in question were
5 7 There may well be
public acts of the German state (jure imperii).
approaches to the customary international law of sovereign immunity
that would allow at least some such litigation to proceed in domestic
courts.5 8 It would be unwise to curtail the ongoing development of
that law by virtue of an international judicial ruling precluding Italy
from providing a forum for redress of otherwise uncompensated
wrongs.5 9 Nothing in the reasoning of previous ICJ judgments on
immunities issues would lead to the conclusion that Italy violated
international law by allowing these suits to proceed. 60
If the ICJ should find that Italy's denial of immunity does violate
international law, how might such an international ruling be received
within domestic law? From outside the Italian legal system it may not
be possible to answer the question posed in that way; indeed, Italian
courts have not yet addressed the effects in Italian law of an ICJ
judgment. 6 1 There is a growing and perhaps still unsettled
jurisprudence of the Corte Costitutzionale and the Corte di Cassazione
on the reception in the Italian legal system of judgments emanating
from the European Court of Human Rights, which may potentially be

57.

Id.

58.
As one illustration (by no means exclusive), some of the actions involved in
the Italian lawsuits were committed by German actors in Italian territory (and also
against Italian nationals). Surely the international law of sovereign immunity should
not a priori foreclose the courts (or other organs) of the territorial state from settling
questions of reparation for wrongful acts committed within its territorial jurisdiction.
Indeed, even the Convention, which generally takes a narrow approach to exceptions to
immunity, would provide for nonimmunity for torts committed within the forum's
territory. UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 1, art. 12.
59.
We may recall in this connection that it was only after numerous
Holocaust-related lawsuits had been brought in the United States that Germany and
other states agreed, decades after the postwar peace treaties which led to partial
reparation for some but not all such claims, to establish new funds for Holocaustrelated claims. Cf. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419-20 (2003) (giving
effect to executive branch policy expressed in international. agreement with Germany
on Holocaust claims, concluded in the face of Holocaust-related litigation in the United
States).
60.
In Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 14), the ICJ did find a core of immunity applicable to sitting heads of state, heads
of government, and foreign ministers, and did instruct Belgium to cancel an arrest
warrant issued in respect of one such official, which Belgium did do. See id. at 33. But
nothing in the reasoning (which was not very fully explained) or result of Arrest
Warrant suggests that the state itself is shielded by customary international law from
all exercises of national judicial jurisdiction in respect of the kind of conduct involved
there or in the pending case between Germany and Italy.
61.
Pavoni, supra note 25, at 82.
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relevant by analogy. 6 2 We could also venture some comparisons to the
U.S. Supreme Court's recent refusal to give effect to an ICJ judgment
as directly applicable law in the United States.6 3
The Italian government and Parliament did enact new
legislation in response to Germany's ICJ case, essentially suspending
enforcement of judgments against Germany (or any similarly situated
applicant) while the ICJ proceedings are pending." However, this is
not permanent legislation; it is currently set to expire at the end of
December 2011.65 It is not clear whether the suspension will be
extended through the completion of the pending case or made
applicable in respect to any new cases that might be brought in future
years.
The German-Italian dispute put the spotlight on a separation-ofpowers angle to the ICJ litigation, namely the stance of the Italian
government (Executive Branch), which has intimated that Germany's
ICJ suit could provide a welcome avenue for putting to rest the
diplomatic frictions that have arisen from the suits against Germany
in national courts.6 6 Italian scholars have deplored the fact that the
Italian government criticized the Italian courts for deciding as they
did in Ferrini and related cases and even overtly supported German
positions, thereby potentially prejudicing the ICJ case.6 7 It may
appear that the Italian government prioritized the interest in friendly
relations with Germany over Italy's other interests, namely obtaining
reparations for victims of Germany's wartime crimes and maintaining
the autonomy of the Italian judiciary in deciding claims brought in
Italian forums. The inference is that if the ICJ were to rule against
Italy, the result would not be entirely unwelcome to the government,
which would then expect Italian courts to fulfill Italy's obligation
under Article 94 of the UN Charter and Article 59 of the ICJ Statute
68
to comply with a judgment adverse to Italy.

62.
For a discussion of recent decisions by the Italian Constitutional Court
restricting the use of European Court of Human Rights rules in domestic courts, see
Giuseppe Cataldi & Massimo lovane, InternationalLaw in Italian Courts 1999-2009:
An Overview of Major Methodological and Substantive Issues, 19 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L.
3, 21-25 (2009).
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498-99 (2008) (holding ICJ decisions not
63.
to be directly enforceable domestic federal law).
64.
See supranote 26.
Atteritano, supra note 25, at 46.
65.
Pavoni, supra note 25, at 81.
66.
Id. at 81-82.
67.
Article 94(1) of the UN Charter provides that UN members "undertake to
68.
comply" with the decisions of the ICJ in cases to which they are parties. U.N. Charter
art. 94, para. 1. Article 59 of the ICJ Statute makes judgments binding between the
parties and in respect of the particular case. Statute of the International Court of
Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.

1200

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 44:1185

Italian courts appear to be fully independent in ascertaining the
existence of rules of customary international law and in applying
them to cases under their jurisdiction.69 If the ICJ should instruct
them that the contested national decisions were based on an
erroneous understanding of customary international law, one might
expect Italian courts to give "respectful consideration" to the views of
that international tribunal, in the words of the U.S. Supreme Court
in Medellin v. Texas. 70 It appears doubtful that an ICJ ruling would
have the direct force of law within the Italian legal system, and it
might well be necessary for some further legislative action to provide
the legal basis for its implementation in Italy.7 Any such legislation
would presumably be subject to constitutional scrutiny, in which
Italian courts would then have to give further clarification to the
priority of different sources of law, including the rights of individuals
to remedies for wrongs, in relation to the ICJ's expected clarification
of only one of those bodies of law.7 2

CONCLUSION

The evolution of the international law of foreign state immunity
over the nineteenth, twentieth, and now twenty-first centuries has
come about through changes in the practice of a variety of actors in
national and international arenas. National courts have not shied
away from taking the initiative to change state practice to meet the
needs of justice. National legislatures have likewise moved the law
forward in response to demands for change. The international treatymaking process, exemplified by the 2004 UN Convention, appears to
be more conservative, in that it is more deferential to the state
preference of not being sued in third-party courts. The lack of
enthusiasm for the Convention, as evidenced by the slow pace of
adoptions, should give pause to those who think that the customary
international law of sovereign immunity should be frozen in place on
the basis of lowest-common-denominator compromises. In light of this
history, one can hope that the ICJ will not block national institutions
from moving the international law of sovereign immunity in a
direction that is responsive to contemporary demands for remedies
due to wrongs committed by states.

Cataldi & Iovane, supra note 62, at 17.
69.
70.
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 513 n.9 (2008) (citing Breard v. Greene,
523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998)).
Pavoni, supra note 25, at 82.
71.
72.
Id. (noting that the Italian Constitutional Court would have to decide
whether such legislation "constitutes a legitimate and proportionate restriction of the
right of access to justice enshrined in Article 24 of the Italian Constitution").

